medicalization

Today’s readings:
Conrad: “The Shifting Engines of Medicalization“  (March 2005)
Couzin: “The Twists and Turns in BRCA’s Path“   (2003)
Lock: “Breast Cancer: Reading the Omens“    (1998)

We’re going to start off with a series of quotes from the Conrad article followed by a direct example of exactly what is being described.
While physicians are still the gatekeepers for many drugs, the pharmaceutical companies have become a major player in medicalization.  In the post-Prozac world, the pharmaceutical industry has been more aggressively promoting their wares to physicians and especially to the public.  (Conrad 5)
Adult ADHD is one example of what Barsky and Boros have identified as the public’s decreased tolerance for mild symptoms and benign problems.  Individual’s self-medicalization is becoming increasingly common, with patients taking their troubles to physicians and often asking directly for a specific medical solution.  (Conrad 9)

This is a society in which we people are treated as consumers.  Conrad is absolutely right.  The Zoloft commercial itself presents depression as a problem that “20 million Americans” suffer from.  Giving us a number like that, with a cartoon representation of depression, makes it seem like the simple blues are something that need to be medicated.  While real depression is a serious issue, that doesn’t really come across in simple commercials.  Quotes like “you aren’t enjoying things like you used to” greatly expands to market for the drug as that can be applied to any number of slumps in life.  Adding “ask your doctor about [fill in the blank]” into any commercial also promotes hypochondria among the masses.  To be honest, it’s almost a scare tactic, and makes it seem like doctors themselves would be holding out on us.  With the increase of self-diagnosis tools, including WebMD which can allow people to jump to the most extreme conclusions first, we are a lot more willing to decide we have a problem when only a few years ago not a second thought would have been given to minor problems.

Conrad is absolutely right in that there is an increasing rise in medicalization, with pharmaceutical companies being driven by profit rather than genuine concern for people with real illnesses.  In this article, as well as the other two listed, there is misinformation of “consumers” of these new technologies.  In terms of the breast cancer gene, as addressed in the Couzin and Lock articles, both mention that the gene describes only a presdisposition to hereditary forms of cancer, or ones that affect multiple members of a family.  Even so, this does not tell you whether or not you will get it, only if you are predisposed.  It’s not actually an 80% chance of getting cancer; it’s an 80% chance once that right environmental triggers happen first, which overall translates to a much lower percentage.  This next series of quotes outlines exactly what I’ve been saying (all from the Lock article):

• The physician and writer Lewis Thomas pointed out more than a decade ago that we live today with an ‘epidemic of anxiety’, caused in large part by the ceaseless assault from the media of messages informing us that we are at risk for everything imaginable. (9)
• ‘Predispose’ is, of course, the significant word here; it cannot be repeated too often that genes do not ‘cause’ cancer in any predetermined way, and further that in the case of breast cancer, more than 90% of its incidence, it seems, is not associated with genetics, but with a complex array of other environmental and social factors.  (9)
• The ‘philosophy of risk’ as Ewald notes, incorporates a secularized approach to life, where God is removed from the scene, leaving the control of events entirely in human hands.  (10)
• Risk becomes, in Douglas’s words, ‘a forensic resource’ whereby individuals can be held accountable.’ (10)

And so we’re back to playing God.  Our desire to control, coupled with lack of complete information, is a powerful force in all genetics projects.  With the thylacine, one of the important goals of the project is to be able to better understand evolution and evolutionary pressures by genetics.  In a society fascinated with the idea of prolonging life, it would make sense that we would focus not only on prolonging lives of individuals but that of the whole human race in general.  We can take into our own hands the genetic anomalies that arise and circumvent genetic pressures.  We want to live forever and the way we see to do that is by conquering this world of genetics.

Cloning and the Politics of Life

Today’s readings (I’ll be putting greater emphasis on the content of the first):
Chapter 5 of Genetic Nature/Culture: Kinship, Genes, and Cloning (Franklin, 2003)
Introduction of Rose’s The Politics of Life Itself (2007)

There was an interesting point brought up by the Franklin selection.  She describes a particular farmer’s efforts to perfect the breeding of cows, keeping a detailed pedigree of the market.  She describes:
The maintenance of such records enabled a differentiation to be drawn between male animals that were “good sire” and those that were not.  In turn this differentiation enabled a reduction of the male animal to a template of its kind. (Franklin 98)
The entire time I was reading this particular section of the chapter, I kept relating it to a sperm bank.  The pedigree of people is somewhat already in existence.  Now, granted, it is a somewhat unconventional method of reproduction but it does exist.  A history of the donor is kept so that people can better choose attributes that are similar to that which they desire for their child.  And the evolution of genetically controlling animal breeding can to some degree be paralleled with genetic developments being made in gene identification in human DNA, with the exception being that animals are being genetic modified for human purposes where we’re looking to modify humans for health (or aesthetic) purposes.

What is interesting however, is that the excerpt laments what is happening to Darwinian evolution, but only a few paragraphs earlier says this:
This innovation [genetically modified animals] is valuable because it enables a new form of pure reproduction in higher mammals, removed from the genetic “noise” of the rut.  The problem with conventional breeding, or course, is that it is unreliable, inefficient, and thus costly. (Franklin 99)
By controlling the reproduction of certain animals, humans are pruning the branches of the tree of evolution.  Sure, other animals are free to change and evolve, but these specific families (cows, etc.) are being stunted in their “right” to evolution.  We’re taking nature out of the picture.  And the same thing is seen with the thylacine (which I might have mentioned in a previous post).  By artificially continuing a branch on the evolutionary chain, humans are overlooking what nature (at least in part on its own or through the growth of the human race) decided to eradicate.

But that wouldn’t matter if we believed that nature did all it could do, that humankind has attained all that it can under the forces of nature, which seems to be a definite implication under the ideas of the Rose excerpt.
[The concept of vital policy is] neither delimited by the poles of illness and health, nor focused on eliminating pathology to protect the destiny of the nation.  Rather, it is concerned with our growing capacities to control, mange, engineer, reshape, and modulate the very vital capacities of human beings as living creatures. (Rose 3)
There seems to be a pervading idea among humankind that we’ve reached a peak.  Now, based on evolution, that wouldn’t seem to be the case as evolving creatures are always better suited to an undeniably evolving environment.  However, because of the dynamic nature of the human species, of our ability to mold our environments (to some degree), we seem to place ourselves above the ideas of evolution we cling to, and have taken it into our own hands to create an ideal:
…these technologies embody disputed visions of what, in individual and or collective human life, may indeed be an optimal state. (6)
And this is all incredibly fascinating because if we look at this from a slightly different point of view, from a purely natural perspective, letting go of the idea that humans are anything but another animal species: our rise could just be part of the evolutionary path for the earth.  Think about it.

On another note, there are interesting ideas presented in the Franklin text about what it means for Dolly to be a clone, how she relationally fits into her family, and what that might mean for societal structure if a matriarchal society were to arise.  But just on the ideas of cloning alone (and being able to have an identity), there is an interesting exploration of this in the film The Island (2005).  All of this, of course, operates under the idea that a human clone would have the same sort of consciousness as a normal human being.  But that also runs into trouble when you’re trying to describe individuals because, genetically you are protein for protein exactly the same as the organism from which you’ve come, so does that detract from individuality?  Or is a different personality or consciousness develops, where does that come from?  And if humankind is slowly moving in the direction of human cloning, no real immortality would ever be reached (presumably that’s the goal), at least not by cloning, because you can’t recreate the essence, the immaterial about a person, only the body in which they resided.

Implications of Genetic Advancement

Readings of choice for today:
Chapter 3 of Genetic: Nature/Culture (Taussig, Heath, Rapp, 2003)
and for those of you with PubMed accounts –> Against selection of human life (Waldschmidt, 1992)

This was a particularly fun week as the structure of the two readings were very drastically different.  Both examine the implications of genetic advancements on the ability of a particular social group to have their own genetic family.  The Taussig chapter examined the Little Person (LP) point of view, with considerable evidence for both sides from normal sized people and LPs.  The Waldschmidt article addressed the issues that disabled persons dealt with, and currently [1992 currently] deal with in Germany.

One thing that was nice to see in the Taussig chapter was the reflective nature with which genetic advancements were treated:
“Like Dr. Francomano and the members of the LPA, our team is concerned about the ways in which molecular discoveries may reinforce eugenic thinking and practices.  And like many members of the constituencies among whom we conducted fieldwork, we also recognize the complex interplay that makes it difficult to distinguish the gifts from the iatrogenic poisons of contemporary medical genetics.” (Taussig 61)
Only a few paragraphs later, the chapter admits that most is a result of biomedical attempts to “play God.”  The discovery of the gene for Huntington’s disease was a major springboard in the support of the Human Genome Project.  However, in the discovery of that gene, it opens up doors to both positive and negative repercussions for the whole project.  Like the quote states above, the ability to see a genetic disorder before it happens can be incredibly valuable.  However, the use of that information can hit some problems.  We don’t know whether it will come down to the abortion of “genetically unfit” fetuses, at least until genetic manipulation in the womb is perfected.

In the issue with LPs in general, there is a great deal of individual choice involved.  No compulsory actions taken.
“This discourse about dwarfism, adoption, and abortion after prenatal diagnosis reveals participants’ awareness and imagination of the future in light of recent and expected scientific discoveries and their application in medical practice.  Here, heightened consciousness of individual choice and biotechnological futurism converge.” (Taussig 69)
Not only are people given the right to choose, but they’re also given the greatest amount of information possible in making that choice.  Sure, societal pressures kick in.  There are absolutely normal sized people who take offense at LPs having families, but there are also a number of stories of LPs taking advantage of prenatal testing to make sure that normal sized children are not born (Taussig 71).  What exists here is a situation in which a group of people are not just isolated by society, but in a sense perpetuate that differentiation and prize it.

Now, the Waldschmidt article was almost uncomfortable to read.  This is a discourse provided by a woman with an undisclosed disability.  The summary itself starts out:
“The eugenics of ancient times and today’s human genetics have enough in common to justify speaking of them as one and the same concept.” (155)
That’s quite the leap.  She goes on to make claims [most of the time merited], that the disabled are unjustly discriminated against.  And while I can’t say how valid her claims are, given that I was not in Germany at or before 1992, but the point seems to be contradicted later on.  Like any activist leader, she demands equality, but what she is actually asking for is an advantage.
First she creates a blanket statement for the argument:
Because the disabled are solely and immutably defined on the basis of “deficiencies,” and not on the basis of their abilities and talents, they are effectively barred from participating in and partaking of society and from mapping out their own lives.  In other words, anyone whose educational ability is rated low, whose work potential cannot be marketed, anyone who cannot move quickly, anyone who is considered ugly, or anyone who cannot communicate verbally or cope with the demands of everyday life on their own is regarded as disabled. (Waldschmidt 157)
Then she offers a perspective from the most negative view:
If we do manage to find a satisfying job, if we do fall in love and have children, we do so not in fulfillment of, but in defiance of the expectations and values that have been handed down by society. (Waldschmidt 160)
And then she creates a bleak future:
They would all face the dilemma of being alive but irrelevant factors according to the technocratic logic of the year 2000.  The disabled would become the human “garbage” of a future society. (Waldschmidt 166)
I don’t doubt her pain and frustration in the kind of society she grew up in, and I absolutely respect her situation and point of view.  However, what she asks for earlier in the article is special accommodations provided as a public service for the disabled community.  And that is something that confuses me.  Because while the community being singled out in a negative way is absolutely despicable,  I wouldn’t call special exceptions as exactly fair by her standards.  Me personally?  I would love to see services be provided for the disabled, I would love to see more equality in society in general.  But in terms of her argument, what she asks doesn’t make sense, especially because she looks down on those non-disabled who fight for the rights and accommodations of those who are.  That is what she’s asking for, so why get upset about it? Some food for thought:

If video does not show, click here.

However, on the part of both authors, I would have to agree with the skepticism over genetic testing, and especially the exploration of the human genome.  There is mention in the Waldschmidt article (if I’m not mistaken) over the generalization of results of animal testing that get applied to humans.  I wouldn’t say that it’s limited just to direct testing of “disease genes” but even just the sequencing of genes in general.  In order to test a gene, we need to know where to put it.  The more that animal DNA is unfolded, the closer we get to doing the same for humans.  When it comes to bringing back the thylacine, an understanding of its DNA and functioning of all the different proteins is almost necessary to insure that they all function properly if the animal is brought back (especially if we’re working from broken DNA fragments).  That’s just preparing the way for more advanced human sequencing.

Ultimately I would have to agree with the closing statement of the Taussig selection:
…we note that a working knowledge of the political history of eugenics gives us reason for pessimism of the intellect, but an ethnographic perspective on the openness of these encounters and practices may give some cause for optimism of the will. (72-73)

The Scandal of Ambivalence – or – a tale of big words..

Today’s quotes come from:
Z. Bauman’s “The Scandal of Ambivalence” in Modernity and Ambivalence (1993)
(or the first chapter)

Bauman starts of with very lofty language to explain a somewhat understandable concept:  the importance of philosophers and their desire to “tame chaos and replace it with order.” (24)  To be honest it was a bit difficult trying to get through those first few pages but once he got off his academic horse, it was much easier to understand.  But no worries, if you’re looking for elitism, he provided that later with his scarily cynical description of scientists!
But in all fairness, Bauman’s descriptions of society are merited.  He has a lot of good observations to share and the philosophical introduction once compared with the content of the rest of that first chapter starts to make things click.

The point that I want to focus on is that he starts off saying:
For pure speculative reason is an organic structure in which there is nothing isolated or independent, but every single part is essential to all the rest; and hence, the slightest imperfection, whether defect or positive error, could not fail to betray itself in use. (24)

I think it’s safe to say that this observation is absolutely true.  Anytime you are sitting in a heated debate, you spend your time looking for one little whole in the conversation and then once you find it, you insert a stick of dynamite and the whole structure upon which argument rests has blown apart.  (Yes, that’s a bit of an exaggeration but you understand what I mean.)  So taking this philosophical standpoint, let’s run over to a later part in chapter one:
Scientists hail objectivity.  They disdain and avoid value judgments.  Once they have done this, the rest is the matter of instrumental rationality.  If the killing of mental patients is economically sound, and technically feasible, why on earth should it not be done? (49)
If a sound argument can be presented for why something should be done, the only hole in the argument is morality.  It is true that scientists spend a good amount of time making airtight cases for what they want to do, how they want to do it, and how it will benefit society, but all from a very intellectual perspective.  When you take the humanity out of it, it becomes lot easier to move forward with genetic progress.  And from here, he says, is where the Holocaust took its root, as well as any other eugenic movement.   So what happens when morality is a necessity in determining technological progress?
There is no reason to doubt the noble intentions of the scientists.  There is less cause still to charge them with malice aforethought.  What the lesson of the Holocaust has taught us, however, is to doubt the wisdom of the scientists’ claim of their right to tell good from bad; the capacity of science as moral authority; indeed, the ability of scientists to locate moral issues and to pass moral judgement of the effects of their actions.  (45-46)
Scientists see the incredible knowledge of what they want to achieve, and see a responsibility (because of the possible benefits) to run forward with experimentation.  But often, for the proponents of any movement, there is extreme bias in what they deem to be appropriate sacrifices to the cause.  There is definitely a taste of a Machiavellian view: “The end justifies the means.” And I would say that is the case with any new projects, but becomes especially complicated with humans, or any living creature, is thrown into the mix.

Take for example the thylacine I’ve attached to.  It is a bold endeavor, would open crazy amounts of doors for future genetic progress, but you also see that
Modern science was born out of the overwhelming ambition to conquer Nature and subordinate it to human needs (39).
Taking it from this standpoint, it can still be seen as a human need to bring back an extinct species.  We feel that we have a moral obligation to this animal, because were it not for humans, it might still be around.  So the need is to satisfy our own “guilt” over having contributed to the extinction of this species.  A lot of the time, however, I think that we see ourselves as an outside force to be controlling all of Nature.  Species have gone extinct in the past because of the encroachment of new animals or interplay of various environmental factors.  No other animals sits and thinks: “Oh, I might have led to the decline of ‘x’ species, I have to try and do something to help bring it back.” Humanity alone has that viewpoint.  Does it not occur to us that we could also just be part of the course of nature?

Different animals species are fluctuating and being replaced at every step of history, but we single ourselves out as something different than that.  But there is no way, in the same contained space, for one species of animal to flourish without adversely affecting another.  Whether it be our depletion of resources for other animals or literally shrinking the amount of space they have on this earth, we are affecting the world around us.  Sure there’s something to be said for the prevention of senseless destruction, and in our higher thinking that is absolutely a responsibility of ours, but no matter what we do, it can’t be “earth’s existing species + growth of humans.”  It will always be “earth’s species + growth of humans – decline of some animals.”  If we are overly concerned with preserving the world as it is, we’ll find ourselves trapped in our current state, unable to move.  There needs to a exist a balance.

So, I agree that it is absolutely important for humans in general to be conscious of endangered species, and working to help protect those animals/plants/etc.  But if something goes extinction, we need to let it go.  Extinction is never caused by just one factor, it is always multiple forces acting together that produce a widespread change in life.  Even the extinction of the dinosaurs has now come to be understood as a combination of efforts on the part of natural forces.  So as long as we’re conscious of our behavior, we can accept that it’s part of nature’s cycle that certain animals give up their time here on Earth.

And I do believe that some scientists would agree with me, but here is where I offer another angle to the argument.  Say, for example, that scientists knew exactly what was going on when they were making progress in animal cloning and bringing back extinct animals.  I don’t think that it would be far-fetched for me to say that the whole point is to get to a place where the same can be done for humans.  There is a lot to be said for Bauman’s quote of scientific endeavors in the human genome:
‘We do not intend to define “bad” traits, only graft the good ones…’ (45)
I do think that it is the ultimate goal to be mapping out everything inheritable in human genetics.  But it doesn’t matter the intention to only graft good traits because in mapping something out, you will undoubtedly find the bad ones as well.  And once that information is out there, you can’t take it back and there’s no telling where it will go.

Where eugenics got started…

Texts referenced:
Stephen Jay Gould’s “Carrie Buck’s Daughter” from an issue of Natural History
J. Holt’s “Measure for Measure: The Strange Science of Francis Galton” from an issue of The New Yorker
Buck V. Bell (1927 U.S. Supreme Court case)

So I have very recently determined the topic that I will follow through with for the rest of this quarter.  A large section of my blog postings will be relating to the thylacine, more commonly known as the Tasmanian tiger.  This animal was given an extinction date in 1936, with more recent years being devoted to mapping out the genome of this extinct animal.  Keep this in mind over the next few paragraphs, it will tie into eugenics!

In the Gould article, he examines a particular instance where sterilization was imposed upon a person under the guise of ending a line of “feeble-minded” genes that would have otherwise been passed on to further generations (this is also the subject of the Supreme Court case seen above).  However, upon digging up the past it was discovered that she was, in fact, of normal intelligence and the main motivation for the sterilization was likely the fact the she was an illegitimate child, and had had an illegitimate child of her own.  Basically, the “elite” of society responded to what they thought was a problem.  Even in the adoption of eugenics altogether, it was mankind identifying a problem, and playing God about it.  Holt described Galton with the following phrase:
“[Galton] was the father of eugenics, the science, or pseudoscience, of “improving” the human race by selective breeding.”
Selective breeding.  That, in theory, should happen on its own in nature, but Galton (as well as all other proponents of eugenics) believed that mankind could speed up this eventual process.  And that’s the key, they really did believe it would happen anyway, largely due to Gregor Mendel’s work with peas.  However, all of these scientific minds understood the vast complexity of the human race, but still subjected it to the same forces as pea plants…
Funnily enough, Galton and his wife never managed to have children themselves, yet he never thought about how this could have been nature’s way of telling him that his genes were not fit to move on.

But as time goes on, and we learn more about the human genome, we have more of a sense of God-like control.  Before, we only had the consciousness to assume that we could play God, and now we have the scientific knowledge to justify it.  Given our incredible genetic abilities, why wouldn’t it be our responsibility to take care of this problem ourselves?  That would be precisely because we aren’t God..or anything close.  We don’t have the foreknowledge to know if our manipulation is a good idea, and in something as complicated as genetics, I wouldn’t want to be the one to risk it.  And not just within the human genome, but in society: humankind doesn’t exactly have the greatest track record for our genetic work.  The shining example of that is the 400,000 people that were sterilized under Hitler’s watch because they were not deemed worthy of the passing on of their genes.  While the number is not as staggering, thousands of people in the U.S. were also sterilized.  People took an idea that was innocent enough (in its ignorance) and sprinted with it.  This is where the thylacine comes in.

The Tasmanian tiger has been extinct since 1936, with at least partial blame being attributed to humans.  And now, they’ve done enough work with genetics to be able to map out genomes.  Certain protein-coding genes from the thylacine have been activated in mice, and with extensive work the entire mitochondrial genome is almost mapped.  So we’ve got the motivation and the knowledge, and here comes the sense of obligation.  But again, consequences are not being considered.  If we bring back this species, what’s next?  How many species will we revive?  When will it stop?  What kind of an impact would this have on the environment?  Think Jurassic Park.

Sometimes, it’s best to let life go on as it is, and stop trying to take the nature out of it.

Genes, Organisms, and their Environments

Today’s post is based off of a few chapters from Richard Lewontin’s book, “The Triple Helix: Gene, Organism, and Environment.”

A few different models of development are discussed in the first two chapters of this book, where development is treated as the inner programs and their outward manifestations.  Comparing various theories, the one settled upon as a greater example of what is probably true, is the Darwinian theory which is based on a variational model of change.  Although later the book does an excellent job of explaining possible issues with this theory as well.  An important distinction that does get made is the different between evolutionists who examine historical consequences of common ancestry, and developmental biologists who examine mechanisms common to to all individuals and even all species.  Individually, using each of these approaches separately, problems can be encountered in the argumentation of each.

The strictly evolutionist approach, while examining common ancestry, could run into problems with ontogeny (or the developmental history of an organism).  To map out evolutionarily what has happened since that common ancestor, the branching off of species and the complicated interactions between genetics and environment would need to be mapped.  Under the norms of reaction, or difference in genotypes and phenotypes based on environmental placing, you would see a singular organism flourishing in varying ways across varying systems.  Ontogenically then, it would be difficult to map out what what it would look like for an organism to have undergone changes based on environmental factors that we are not necessarily aware of, especially if we encounter gaps in the chain of evolution.  Mapping out patterns of similarity between organisms could point out a common ancestor (helping to fill in gaps), but not necessarily so.  It could be that certain environmental factors could have elicited parallel changes in various species of animals that might have actually brought them genetically closer than they had been before the change.

Something however that I found to be fascinating was the interplay between genetics and environmental triggers for certain genes as described in pages 37 and 38.  Genetics alone is not enough to explain various difference in phenotypes, but it seems that environment is not either.  Even something like the time that it takes for biological processes, like cell formation and multiplication, factor into the development of certain genotypes and phenotypes.  An interesting example given is the strength of cognitive functions among individuals who otherwise might have had the same innate ability.  These cognitive functions end up being partially dependent on whether or not specific neural connections are strengthened during developmental stages.  And for these connections to be reinforced, they would have to have randomly formed.  So there is an element of variability even with things that are coded into our genes.

Socially, it is just interesting to see how genetics became as prominent as it is:

“But this environmentalist dominance was short-lived, and within twenty years of the end of the war, genetic explanations again came to dominate, in no small part because psychology and sociology failed to produce a coherent predictive scheme for human psychic and social development.” (p. 16)

With the idea that genes could code for disorders and illnesses, the yet unexplained genome was quick to be ascribed to anything that humans wanted to be explained by genetics.  However, just after WWII, there was an environmental dominated idea of the differences between race.  Once more started to be learned about DNA, it was quick to be picked up again.  Other theories were tested and failed to come up with all-encompassing explanations.  DNA and genes in general are easy to pinpoint in this way because we have yet to acquire enough knowledge to completely understand the human genome and disprove yet another theory that explains away human development.  In the same way that the robots human are fascinated with creating (that are described in the first chapters of Kelly’s Out of Control) will never really be able to understand or recognize the changes that we as creators make to them from model to model, it is uncertain whether humans (even in our heightened awareness) will ever really be able to completely understand the progression of evolution.  On top of not necessarily being able to pinpoint sources of change within the human genome, the immensely complex nature of the inner processes factored in with the various aspects of environment changes would lead to countless possibilities for change.  It would seem that the reason for desiring to understand all of this information is for better predictions of the future, or at least to change what we see today.  But given the intense discussion of the incredible amount of factors that affect each change in genotype or phenotype, it would seem almost silly that we could cure illness with a simple genetic correction.  This genetic change would have to happen under exactly the right circumstances: there would need to be the right environmental pressures, the right interaction of this new gene with existing genes, and a synchronization of the processes within the body.  Is it that complex?  Or is it that simple?

“The DNA Mystique”

The DNA Mystique (Nelkin and Lindee)

All quotations have been taken from the above text.
“Gene” as a term tossed around by society, used to explain all sorts of things including: shyness, obesity, criminality, and all sorts of behaviors.  It’s used to explain away a lot of behaviors as well.  Rather than dealing with environmental factors within society that could really be explaining how a person arrived where they are, DNA is an easy out.  We know that it does code for some physical things, so why can’t it code beyond that?  The idea, has been disputed in popular culture.  The 1997 film, Gattaca, includes a subtitle: “There is no gene for the human spirit.”

As a culture obsessed with the possession of knowledge, we’ve taken it upon ourselves to try and completely define even that which may not be definable.  Yet there is a great idea that more knowledge leads to greater benefit for humankind.  Understanding the human genome would, in fact, provide a lot of information that could lead to better health.  But I have to wonder, how much of the research that’s done is really for that intention and not just the sole pursuit of information?  Nelkin and Lindee write “[Researchers] contribute to popular imagery as they popularize their work in ways that resonate with larger social concerns.”  So then it can be said that whatever leaps and bounds have been made are packaged in such a way that the public can’t possibly refuse them.

And with “necessary” advances in knowledge comes the bonus information:

“Behavioral geneticists and psychologists, working with human twins and extrapolating from animal models, have attributed shyness, intelligence, criminality, even religiosity and other complex human traits to heredity.”

What this text fails to do is explain exactly how it is that scientists have attributed such characteristics to locations on the genome.  There is enough discussion as to being able to describe just how much of a trait is expressed because of genetics versus environmental factors, however with what certainty can it be said that these traits are in your DNA to begin with?  And if it’s an increased coding for some type of hormone, how can we say for certain that this would be expressed?  Environmental factors on their own complicate human characteristics enough; I can’t say that I really agree that these sorts of things can be found on the genome.  To do so would be to assume that a human is equal to the sum of his/her parts, where I believe that to be human is to be greater than that.  Is society ready to reduce us to that?

About Me!

My name is Kathy and I’m creating this blog as a part of my genomics class here at Northwestern University.  I’m a junior here and have been really interested in genetics from a biological perspective.  Now is my chance to see it from the view of an anthropologist!

A little bit about me: I’m an economics major looking to do microfinance type stuff after I graduate.  (I started out pre-med which is why I have the biology interest!)  I also have a big interest in understanding culture from a religious perspective.  So that’s a little bit about myself and I hope that you enjoy reading over these next few weeks!